Afghanistan–Pakistan Conflict Explained: History, Tensions, and India’s Role

In the wake of the tragic Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 civilians, tensions have escalated across the region, prompting sharp diplomatic exchanges. On May 10, 2025, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri dismissed as “ludicrous claims” the Pakistan Army’s accusation that India fired missiles into Afghanistan. This incident exposes how the Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict zone is becoming a volatile theatre for misinformation, proxy blame-games, and regional instability with wider geopolitical stakes.

What are Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes

Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes refer to frequent armed confrontations along the Durand Line, the contentious ~2,600 km border between the two countries. These are typically not full-scale battles but skirmishes, involving gunfire, shelling, or short incursions. These incidents are triggered by territorial disputes, cross-border militant activity, or efforts to build infrastructure like fences and posts in contested areas.

• These clashes are deeply rooted in history, dating back to 1947 when Pakistan was created. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s UN membership initially, due to the non-recognition of the Durand Line.
• The friction spans various Afghan regimes, from monarchies to the Taliban, and has evolved through decades of political changes and shifting power centers.
• The border clashes are tied into broader regional security challenges, especially the operations of insurgent groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who use the porous frontier as a strategic advantage.
• These confrontations are therefore not just military incidents but symbols of larger geopolitical tensions and national identity issues for both countries.

Why these clashes occur

The reasons behind these clashes are multi-dimensional, involving territorial, security, and political dynamics that often intersect and feed into each other.

• The Durand Line remains a key territorial dispute. Afghanistan’s refusal to accept it as an international boundary stems from the colonial context in which it was drawn. The concept of Pashtunistan, a united Pashtun homeland, continues to influence Afghan nationalist rhetoric.
• Cross-border militancy is central. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of harboring TTP militants who attack Pakistani targets, while Afghanistan blames Pakistan for hosting anti-Afghan groups. In 2024, over 850 terrorist incidents were reported in Pakistan, many linked to Afghan-based operatives.
• Sovereignty and control issues emerge frequently. Pakistan continues to fence the border to prevent infiltration, which the Taliban sees as unilateral and provocative. Taliban forces have even removed parts of the fencing or tried building their own posts, sparking violence.
• Post-Taliban takeover politics have created new tensions. Pakistan expected the Taliban’s 2021 return to benefit bilateral ties, but the Taliban’s reluctance to act against TTP has caused deep frustration in Islamabad.
• Many clashes are triggered by small, local incidents. Misunderstandings between patrols, attacks by smugglers, or cross-border tribal disputes can escalate quickly due to the absence of effective crisis-management mechanisms. Thousands of civilians, especially in tribal communities, suffer as collateral victims.

Where clashes frequently happen

Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes tend to erupt in volatile border regions where terrain is difficult, tribal affiliations blur national lines, and militant activity is dense. Several key flashpoints have emerged over the years, consistently witnessing hostilities.

• Torkham (Khyber Pass): A strategic crossing between Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province. Tensions peaked in early 2025 during Ramadan, leading to prolonged border closure, affecting 15,000 civilians and disrupting essential trade. Clashes here are often linked to post-construction disputes or Taliban objections to border enforcement.
• Chaman–Spin Boldak: This major Balochistan–Kandahar crossing has seen deadly encounters, especially in 2022 and 2023, where both civilians and border personnel were killed. Pakistan’s fencing activities and Taliban pushback over sovereignty claims fuel skirmishes.
• Kurram and Bajaur tribal districts: Situated along a rugged frontier with Afghanistan’s Khost, Paktia, and Kunar provinces, these areas are TTP strongholds. Notably, in September 2024, Taliban forces clashed with Pakistani troops over a new outpost in Kurram. In 2025, Taliban-aligned fighters briefly took over Pakistani border positions in Bajaur.
• North and South Waziristan: These have been sites of heavy cross-border infiltration, with both Taliban and TTP operating in and out of these zones. Pakistan’s military operations often trigger Taliban resistance across the border.
• Helmand–Balochistan desert border: Although sparsely populated, this terrain enables Baloch insurgents to move undetected. Pakistan suspects that some Baloch militants use Afghan territory for safe haven, further straining ties.
• Mountainous terrain and informal routes: The entire Durand Line is marked by passes, valleys, and unguarded trails, which aid smuggling and militant movements. These poorly monitored routes are high-risk zones for confrontations between security forces.
• Border villages: Areas like Landi Kotal and Chaman town have witnessed mortar shelling and sniper fire, leading to civilian casualties and displacements. These villages often find themselves unintentionally at the center of armed confrontations when militants operate nearby or border guards respond to perceived threats.

When major clashes have taken place (key historical timelines)

Border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan are not new. They stretch back to the birth of Pakistan in 1947, with every decade witnessing key flashpoints that shaped today’s volatility.

• 1949–1950: Afghanistan repudiated the Durand Line and supported tribal uprisings. A brief incursion into Balochistan in 1950 was repelled by Pakistani forces, setting a precedent for direct confrontation.
• 1960–1963: The Pashtunistan campaign saw Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Daoud Khan send tribesmen into Bajaur to stir separatism. Local Pashtuns sided with Pakistan, defeating the incursion. Afghanistan cut off diplomatic ties in 1961 until Daoud’s fall in 1963.
• 1970s: During Daoud’s presidency, Afghanistan backed Baloch and Pashtun insurgents in Pakistan. In response, Pakistan aided Islamist fighters opposing Daoud. While clashes were mostly through proxies, it deepened mistrust.
• 1980s–1990s: During the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan-backed Mujahideen operated from Pakistani soil. Occasional shelling from Soviet-backed Afghan forces into Pakistan occurred. After the Taliban rose to power (1996), border tensions eased, but accusations of Pakistani interference persisted.
• 2000s: With the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Pakistan was accused of harboring the Taliban insurgency. In 2007, fencing attempts led to deadly exchanges. Border shelling became more common as Pakistan targeted TTP militants fleeing into Afghanistan.
• 2010s: Pakistan expanded border fencing. In 2017, an attack on Pakistani census workers near Chaman led to a deadly clash and prolonged closure. From 2018–2021, small-scale incidents occurred during fence construction and militant chases.
• 2021–2022: After the Taliban takeover, Pakistan welcomed the regime initially but soon grew disillusioned. In April 2022, Pakistan conducted airstrikes in Kunar and Khost, killing civilians and fighters, leading to strong Afghan protests.
• 2023: TTP attacks intensified. Pakistani border forces clashed with Afghan Taliban near Kurram and Chaman during anti-militant operations. Taliban responses became more aggressive, showcasing growing confidence.
• 2024: A pivotal year. After a TTP bombing killed Pakistani troops in March, Pakistan bombed militant camps in Afghanistan. The most severe clash came on 7 September 2024 when Afghan forces tried erecting a new post in Kurram; Pakistan responded with artillery and airpower, destroying Taliban armor. In December, following another TTP ambush, Pakistan conducted large-scale airstrikes in Paktika, killing dozens. Days of firefights ensued.
• 2025: Hostilities continued into the new year. Reports emerged of Taliban-linked militants briefly seizing border posts in Bajaur. February saw frequent clashes in Torkham, leading to its closure. Thousands of traders and villagers were affected, while diplomatic efforts to ease tensions remained inconclusive.

Who are the main actors and stakeholders

The Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes involve multiple actors whose interests, ideologies, and actions shape the course and intensity of the conflict. These actors range from state governments to militant groups and even external powers.

• Afghan Taliban regime: Since seizing power in 2021, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, led by the Taliban, is the primary Afghan actor. Its border forces and fighters are directly involved in frontier skirmishes. While the Taliban claim to seek peaceful ties with Pakistan, they firmly defend what they call Afghan sovereignty and strongly oppose unilateral Pakistani fencing. Their refusal to crack down on TTP has become a sticking point. Ideological ties, shared tribal roots, and strategic calculations make the Taliban reluctant to act decisively against TTP. Internally, more hardline Taliban factions push a confrontational stance, influencing local border incidents.
• Pakistan’s government and military: The Pakistani state, especially the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps, is responsible for securing the border and responding to any militant or military provocations. Islamabad views the Afghan Taliban as both a partner and a threat. Despite early hopes of strategic alignment post-2021, Pakistan’s security establishment has become increasingly frustrated with the Taliban’s inaction against the TTP. Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan, military drills near the border, and border closures reflect a hardened policy, although Islamabad also grapples with internal economic stress that discourages full-scale conflict.
• Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): The TTP is a powerful insurgent group with an estimated 30,000–35,000 fighters, operating from Afghan territory and staging attacks inside Pakistan. The TTP is the key catalyst behind many clashes, as its actions often provoke Pakistani retaliation. Despite being distinct from the Afghan Taliban, the two share ideological and tribal ties, complicating any efforts to dislodge the TTP from Afghan sanctuaries. Pakistan sees the group as a top internal threat, while the Taliban proposes negotiation instead of confrontation.
• Local tribes and militias: Border clashes directly affect Pashtun tribes like the Afridi, Mehsud, and Shinwari, whose ancestral lands straddle the Durand Line. These communities suffer the most due to displacement, civilian casualties, and disrupted livelihoods. They sometimes mediate tensions or participate in skirmishes, either to protect local turf or as part of broader tribal loyalties. The Baloch insurgents, especially in the southern frontier, add another layer to the conflict, as Pakistan accuses Kabul of hosting Baloch separatist elements.
• International stakeholders:
  • China maintains close ties with Pakistan and is cautiously engaging the Taliban to protect its Belt and Road Initiative. China fears that instability could spread extremism, including support for Uyghur militants (ETIM). It has quietly pushed both countries to cooperate.
  • The United States and NATO allies, while militarily withdrawn, remain concerned about Afghanistan becoming a terrorist sanctuary again. They use aid and sanctions to pressure the Taliban, indirectly influencing Af-Pak dynamics.
  • Iran and Central Asian states worry about Sunni extremist spillover and instability that might affect their own borders.
  • India sees the clashes as part of its strategic equation with Pakistan and Afghanistan. India previously supported anti-Taliban governments and remains wary of terrorist threats that could arise if Afghanistan turns into a jihadist hub.

How the clashes manifest (methods, strategies, incidents)

Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes take many forms, ranging from violent engagements to non-military strategies such as economic pressure or diplomatic protests. These tactics reveal both the intensity and complexity of the ongoing hostilities.

• Military skirmishes and firefights: The most common form of confrontation involves small-arms fire, machine guns, and mortars exchanged between border posts. For example, during February and March 2025, clashes occurred regularly at Torkham, with heavy weapons used by both sides. In September 2024, a serious engagement in Kurram saw the destruction of a Taliban T-62 tank by Pakistani artillery.
• Cross-border terrorism and raids: Militants, especially the TTP, cross from Afghanistan into Pakistan to launch attacks and retreat. In response, Pakistan has conducted “hot pursuit” operations and airstrikes targeting suspected camps inside Afghanistan. The 25 December 2024 airstrike on Paktika province marked a major escalation, with Pakistan claiming to have killed senior TTP figures while Kabul decried civilian deaths.
• Border closures and economic blockades: Pakistan uses border shutdowns as strategic leverage. In early 2025, the Torkham crossing was closed for 12 days, affecting over 5,000 trucks and causing an estimated $15 million in losses. These actions hurt Afghanistan’s fragile economy and compel Taliban leaders to negotiate or ease tensions.
• Troop buildups and show of force: Military posturing is common. After Pakistan’s airstrikes in December 2024, the Taliban deployed over 15,000 troops and US-supplied armored vehicles near the border. Pakistan responded with drills and jet flyovers, increasing the risk of accidental escalations.
• Diplomatic protests and propaganda: Each clash is followed by official condemnation from both sides. The Taliban accuse Pakistan of violating sovereignty, while Pakistan blames the Taliban for harboring terrorists. Propaganda videos, such as the TTP showcasing a captured Pakistani post, or Pakistani drone footage of border strikes, shape domestic narratives and public sentiment.
• Civilians in the crossfire: Tragically, villagers often suffer. In 2022, Afghan mortar fire into Chaman killed 7 Pakistani civilians. In 2024, Pakistani shelling into Afghan villages caused numerous casualties, including women and children. These incidents lead to mass displacements, with relief camps set up in Landi Kotal and Khost to house those fleeing violence.

Comparison Chart: Afghanistan vs Pakistan perspectives on border clashes

Aspect	Afghanistan’s Perspective	Pakistan’s Perspective
Durand Line (Border)	Views the Durand Line as a colonial relic and refuses formal recognition. Believes the border divides Pashtun communities unjustly and undermines national identity.	Recognizes the Durand Line as the legal international boundary based on 1947 agreements. Sees border enforcement as critical to national security and sovereignty.
Militant Sanctuaries	Denies hosting the TTP but avoids taking strong actions against them. Accuses Pakistan of exaggerating threats and points to Islamabad’s historic support for the Taliban during past conflicts.	Blames Afghanistan for sheltering the TTP, whose attacks destabilize Pakistan. Views Taliban inaction as deliberate or complicit and justifies strikes or pressure as defensive measures.
Border Management	Opposes Pakistan’s unilateral border fencing and check-posts, which it sees as encroachments. Prefers porous traditional crossings and calls for consultation before any construction.	Argues that fencing and check-posts are vital to stopping terrorist infiltration. Has fenced 90% of the frontier and demands Taliban cooperation in respecting these measures.
Approach to Clashes	Claims Pakistan initiates aggression, including airstrikes and shelling. Responds with troop deployments or jirgas, but avoids wider war. Demands respect for Afghan territorial integrity.	Views its actions as retaliatory to provocations or terror attacks. Employs military pressure and border closures to compel Taliban cooperation. Supports limited dialogue, but prioritizes security assurances first.

Significance for regional security and geopolitics

Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes have broader implications that extend far beyond their immediate border, affecting regional stability, international diplomacy, and strategic alignments across South-Central Asia.

• Terrorism and regional instability: The prolonged conflict creates space for groups like TTP and ISIS-K to thrive. These groups can launch attacks into Pakistan, and possibly even India, Central Asia, or Western interests. The risk of a terrorist spillover remains high as both governments struggle to fully control their border regions.
• Fragility of two unstable states: Afghanistan is under sanctions and diplomatic isolation, while Pakistan battles economic crises and political turmoil. Border clashes increase military spending, displace civilians, and inflame nationalist sentiment in both countries. For Pakistan, fighting multiple fronts – especially amid 30% inflation and social unrest – weakens national cohesion. For Afghanistan, losing trade routes or international sympathy further isolates the Taliban regime.
• Great power stakes:
  • China, with investments in CPEC and interests in a stable neighborhood, views these clashes with concern. It pushes for trilateral talks and regional integration, but also fears that chaos could embolden Uyghur militants.
  • The U.S. and NATO watch the situation warily. They fear Afghanistan might return to being a terror haven, reversing 20 years of counter-terror work. A destabilized Af-Pak corridor could also affect wider global terror networks.
  • Russia and Iran observe with geopolitical calculations. While they oppose Western influence, neither wants uncontrolled Sunni extremism near their borders. A worsening conflict could increase drug trafficking, arms movement, and refugee flow, troubling Iran in particular.
• India’s strategic position: India benefits if Pakistan is bogged down on its western border, reducing focus on Kashmir. However, India also fears that Afghan instability could feed radical groups that threaten Indian security. The presence of India-hostile groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan means New Delhi must tread carefully, balancing engagement with security vigilance.
• Shifting alliances and nuclear risk: The worsening of Af-Pak relations could redraw regional alignments. Pakistan may seek closer ties with China or the Gulf if tensions with the Taliban worsen. The Taliban may turn toward Iran or Russia. This realignment could marginalize Western influence or spark proxy competitions. More seriously, although unlikely, the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state raises concerns. A miscalculated strike, or massive border confrontation, could attract global intervention or mediation.

Challenges and limitations in resolving the issue

Despite repeated calls for dialogue and restraint, several deep-rooted challenges hinder lasting resolution of Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes. These obstacles are political, historical, structural, and practical in nature.

• Lack of trust: Mutual suspicion and historical grievances dominate the relationship. Afghanistan views Pakistan as a manipulative neighbor that supported insurgents for decades, while Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a base for anti-Pakistan militants. This distrust runs deep and hampers even routine crisis resolution.
• Border legitimacy dispute: Afghanistan’s refusal to recognize the Durand Line is a major impediment. No Afghan government, including the Taliban, has accepted it formally due to national pride and ethnic politics. For Pakistan, however, the Durand Line is non-negotiable. This creates a fundamental disagreement that blocks formal agreements on border security.
• Militant dynamics: The Taliban’s ties with TTP complicate the situation. Many Taliban commanders sympathize ideologically or are tribally linked to the TTP. Acting against them could cause internal fractures or push them toward ISIS-K, an enemy of the Taliban. On the other hand, Pakistan cannot eliminate TTP effectively while they have safe havens inside Afghanistan.
• Lack of recognition and formal mechanisms: The Taliban regime is not officially recognized by most of the world, including Pakistan. As a result, formal treaties or legally binding agreements are difficult to structure. There are also no trusted third parties or established frameworks to mediate border disputes or verify compliance.
• Domestic political pressures: In both countries, leaders face intense internal pressure. Pakistan’s military and public demand a hard line after terrorist attacks. In Afghanistan, younger Taliban fighters and hardliners reject any compromise with Pakistan, seeing it as bowing to a hostile neighbor. These domestic realities limit room for flexible diplomacy.
• Propaganda and misinformation: Each clash is followed by a flood of conflicting claims, videos, and nationalistic narratives. These shape public opinion and harden political positions, making backchannel or quiet diplomacy more difficult. Without neutral monitoring, truth becomes elusive and accountability impossible.
• Unpredictable ground dynamics: The border terrain is difficult and communications poor. Local commanders often act on their own judgment, leading to unauthorized provocations. A small skirmish can quickly turn into a broader fight if not controlled. Both the Taliban’s decentralized units and Pakistan’s tribal area deployment face command and control challenges.

India’s strategic and regional involvement

India’s stake in the Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict is shaped by its own security interests, regional strategy, and long-standing tensions with Pakistan. While not directly involved, India’s positioning and policies reflect careful calibration.

• Historic ties with Afghanistan: India supported successive Afghan governments from 2001–2021 with $3 billion in aid, building major infrastructure like Salma Dam and Afghan Parliament. This effort was partly to counter Pakistan’s influence and build goodwill with the Afghan people. The Taliban’s return was a setback, but India quickly adjusted to maintain presence and dialogue.
• Security concerns: India fears that Afghan instability could allow terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed to regroup. A weakened Pakistan might redirect radical elements toward Kashmir, or create nuclear security risks. India closely monitors TTP, ISIS-K, and Haqqani network activities from Afghan territory.
• Allegations from Pakistan: Islamabad accuses India of using Afghan soil to support Baloch separatists and the TTP—claims India denies. These allegations underline Pakistan’s belief that India exploits Af-Pak tensions to pressure Pakistan strategically. While no evidence is publicly available, the perception affects regional diplomacy.
• India’s outreach to Taliban: India has restarted engagement with the Taliban. In 2022, it sent humanitarian aid (like 50,000 tonnes of wheat) and re-opened its embassy with a technical team. Quiet talks with Taliban officials in Doha and Moscow signal India’s intent to remain involved while ensuring Afghan territory is not used against it.
• Strategic balancing: The clashes offer India both opportunities and risks. Pakistan’s preoccupation with its western border could reduce focus on eastern tensions. However, India fears that chaos in Afghanistan could spill extremism, impacting its own security. Therefore, India promotes stability without overt alignment to either party.
• Connectivity and influence: India supports regional projects that bypass Pakistan, such as Chabahar Port in Iran and International North-South Transport Corridor. If Af-Pak tensions persist, India’s alternative route to Central Asia via Iran and Afghanistan gains relevance. India also participates in multilateral formats like the Moscow Format and SCO summits to influence the regional discourse.

Way forward: resolution and cooperation strategies

Addressing the Afghanistan–Pakistan clashes requires multi-layered strategies combining diplomacy, military restraint, economic incentives, and grassroots confidence-building. A sustainable resolution is only possible if both nations recognize their mutual vulnerabilities and interdependence.

• Bilateral dialogue mechanisms: Both countries must resume structured dialogue. Revival of border flag meetings, military-to-military communication channels, and political negotiations can prevent misunderstandings from escalating. Creating a joint monitoring cell to track and verify border incidents may help establish transparency and reduce accusations.
• Third-party facilitation: Given the deep mistrust, a neutral country like China could mediate. China’s trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan on counterterrorism can evolve into broader security discussions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or United Nations could act as platforms for confidence-building measures, including observer missions or even border demarcation verification.
• Joint counter-terrorism cooperation: The core grievance—TTP safe havens—needs urgent bilateral coordination. Pakistan could provide intelligence dossiers on TTP camps, and the Taliban might act or at least relocate known operatives to disrupt their operations. In return, Pakistan could offer support in tackling ISIS-K, which threatens Taliban rule. A quid pro quo model may be the only feasible interim arrangement.
• Border management protocols: Both sides could agree on co-managed outposts in high-risk zones, where presence is minimal but monitored. Pakistan could also agree to open controlled border crossings for tribal communities, reducing friction. A joint border commission to handle fencing disputes and future construction can prevent accidental provocations.
• Economic interdependence: Increasing bilateral trade and opening more official routes for goods and services will raise the cost of conflict. Pakistan can offer access to Karachi port, power supply arrangements, and import concessions if Afghanistan enforces border stability. Conversely, Afghanistan could assist in refugee repatriation, anti-polio campaigns, and drug trafficking control. These steps reduce hostility and enhance positive engagement.
• Addressing internal discontent: Pakistan must also respond to its internal Pashtun grievances, which are often linked to military operations in tribal areas. Addressing demands of groups like Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) could reduce the radicalization potential. Similarly, the Taliban can incorporate more inclusive governance, recognizing ethnic diversity to create broader legitimacy and reduce reliance on militant alliances.
• Managing propaganda and crisis communication: Both countries should establish joint media protocols to curb disinformation during border incidents. Fact-finding teams or agreed messaging strategies can avoid unnecessary escalation due to propaganda videos or false claims. Direct hotline access between field commanders is essential for rapid de-escalation.

Conclusion

The Afghanistan–Pakistan border conflict is a serious flashpoint that impacts not only the two nations involved but the entire region’s stability and future. Rooted in colonial-era disputes, inflamed by militancy, and sustained by political misgivings, the clashes today are more than a local issue—they are a threat to economic progress, security, and diplomacy in South-Central Asia. While both sides have shown restraint to avoid full-scale war, frequent flare-ups continue to displace civilians, halt trade, and embolden extremist groups. For genuine peace, pragmatic compromises, coordinated security steps, and internationally-supported frameworks must be adopted. Trust must be rebuilt one step at a time, anchored in mutual respect, shared economic gain, and a long-term vision for regional integration. Only then can Afghanistan and Pakistan move beyond the trenches of mistrust toward a future of stability and cooperation.

Practice Question: How do Afghanistan–Pakistan border clashes influence regional connectivity and economic integration efforts in South and Central Asia? (250 words)